| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm ioctl: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget
It appears like cmd could be a Spectre v1 gadget as it's supplied by a
user and used as an array index. Prevent the contents of kernel memory
from being leaked to userspace via speculative execution by using
array_index_nospec. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udmabuf: validate ubuf->pagecount
Syzbot has reported GPF in sg_alloc_append_table_from_pages(). The
problem was in ubuf->pages == ZERO_PTR.
ubuf->pagecount is calculated from arguments passed from user-space. If
user creates udmabuf with list.size == 0 then ubuf->pagecount will be
also equal to zero; it causes kmalloc_array() to return ZERO_PTR.
Fix it by validating ubuf->pagecount before passing it to
kmalloc_array(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/plane: Move range check for format_count earlier
While the check for format_count > 64 in __drm_universal_plane_init()
shouldn't be hit (it's a WARN_ON), in its current position it will then
leak the plane->format_types array and fail to call
drm_mode_object_unregister() leaking the modeset identifier. Move it to
the start of the function to avoid allocating those resources in the
first place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret
When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets
a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the
panic:
fd = memfd_secret();
ftruncate(fd, 10);
ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
strcpy(ptr, "123456789");
munmap(ptr, 10);
ftruncate(fd, 20);
The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down
into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually
we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this
via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to
memset()).
For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the
direct map (i.e. we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every
fault). So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and
when we try to memset() with it we panic.
This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for
memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for
the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try
to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL.
One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will
require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal
fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend
memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch.
[1]:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10
Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01
RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8
RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028
RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028
R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0
R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8
FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190
truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830
truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80
simple_setattr+0x37/0x60
notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0
do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0
__x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet
CR2: ffffa0a889277028
[lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static]
[axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix panic when forwarding a pkt with no in6 dev
kongweibin reported a kernel panic in ip6_forward() when input interface
has no in6 dev associated.
The following tc commands were used to reproduce this panic:
tc qdisc del dev vxlan100 root
tc qdisc add dev vxlan100 root netem corrupt 5% |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: fix unexpected zeroed page mapping with zram swap
Two processes under CLONE_VM cloning, user process can be corrupted by
seeing zeroed page unexpectedly.
CPU A CPU B
do_swap_page do_swap_page
SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path
swap_readpage valid data
swap_slot_free_notify
delete zram entry
swap_readpage zeroed(invalid) data
pte_lock
map the *zero data* to userspace
pte_unlock
pte_lock
if (!pte_same)
goto out_nomap;
pte_unlock
return and next refault will
read zeroed data
The swap_slot_free_notify is bogus for CLONE_VM case since it doesn't
increase the refcount of swap slot at copy_mm so it couldn't catch up
whether it's safe or not to discard data from backing device. In the
case, only the lock it could rely on to synchronize swap slot freeing is
page table lock. Thus, this patch gets rid of the swap_slot_free_notify
function. With this patch, CPU A will see correct data.
CPU A CPU B
do_swap_page do_swap_page
SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path
swap_readpage original data
pte_lock
map the original data
swap_free
swap_range_free
bd_disk->fops->swap_slot_free_notify
swap_readpage read zeroed data
pte_unlock
pte_lock
if (!pte_same)
goto out_nomap;
pte_unlock
return
on next refault will see mapped data by CPU B
The concern of the patch would increase memory consumption since it
could keep wasted memory with compressed form in zram as well as
uncompressed form in address space. However, most of cases of zram uses
no readahead and do_swap_page is followed by swap_free so it will free
the compressed form from in zram quickly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Deactivate sysctl_record_panic_msg by default in isolated guests
hv_panic_page might contain guest-sensitive information, do not dump it
over to Hyper-V by default in isolated guests.
While at it, update some comments in hyperv_{panic,die}_event(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: unmark inode in use in error path
Unmark inode in use if error encountered. If the in-use flag leakage
occurs in cachefiles_open_file(), Cachefiles will complain "Inode
already in use" when later another cookie with the same index key is
looked up.
If the in-use flag leakage occurs in cachefiles_create_tmpfile(), though
the "Inode already in use" warning won't be triggered, fix the leakage
anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
veth: Ensure eth header is in skb's linear part
After feeding a decapsulated packet to a veth device with act_mirred,
skb_headlen() may be 0. But veth_xmit() calls __dev_forward_skb(),
which expects at least ETH_HLEN byte of linear data (as
__dev_forward_skb2() calls eth_type_trans(), which pulls ETH_HLEN bytes
unconditionally).
Use pskb_may_pull() to ensure veth_xmit() respects this constraint.
kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2328!
RIP: 0010:eth_type_trans+0xcf/0x140
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dev_forward_skb2+0xe3/0x160
veth_xmit+0x6e/0x250 [veth]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc7/0x200
__dev_queue_xmit+0x47f/0x520
? skb_ensure_writable+0x85/0xa0
? skb_mpls_pop+0x98/0x1c0
tcf_mirred_act+0x442/0x47e [act_mirred]
tcf_action_exec+0x86/0x140
fl_classify+0x1d8/0x1e0 [cls_flower]
? dma_pte_clear_level+0x129/0x1a0
? dma_pte_clear_level+0x129/0x1a0
? prb_fill_curr_block+0x2f/0xc0
? skb_copy_bits+0x11a/0x220
__tcf_classify+0x58/0x110
tcf_classify_ingress+0x6b/0x140
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x47d/0xfd0
? __iommu_dma_unmap_swiotlb+0x44/0x90
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x3d/0xa0
netif_receive_skb+0x116/0x170
be_process_rx+0x22f/0x330 [be2net]
be_poll+0x13c/0x370 [be2net]
__napi_poll+0x2a/0x170
net_rx_action+0x22f/0x2f0
__do_softirq+0xca/0x2a8
__irq_exit_rcu+0xc1/0xe0
common_interrupt+0x83/0xa0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc: Fix virt_addr_valid() for 64-bit Book3E & 32-bit
mpe: On 64-bit Book3E vmalloc space starts at 0x8000000000000000.
Because of the way __pa() works we have:
__pa(0x8000000000000000) == 0, and therefore
virt_to_pfn(0x8000000000000000) == 0, and therefore
virt_addr_valid(0x8000000000000000) == true
Which is wrong, virt_addr_valid() should be false for vmalloc space.
In fact all vmalloc addresses that alias with a valid PFN will return
true from virt_addr_valid(). That can cause bugs with hardened usercopy
as described below by Kefeng Wang:
When running ethtool eth0 on 64-bit Book3E, a BUG occurred:
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object not in SLUB page?! (offset 0, size 1048)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99
...
usercopy_abort+0x64/0xa0 (unreliable)
__check_heap_object+0x168/0x190
__check_object_size+0x1a0/0x200
dev_ethtool+0x2494/0x2b20
dev_ioctl+0x5d0/0x770
sock_do_ioctl+0xf0/0x1d0
sock_ioctl+0x3ec/0x5a0
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf0/0x160
system_call_exception+0xfc/0x1f0
system_call_common+0xf8/0x200
The code shows below,
data = vzalloc(array_size(gstrings.len, ETH_GSTRING_LEN));
copy_to_user(useraddr, data, gstrings.len * ETH_GSTRING_LEN))
The data is alloced by vmalloc(), virt_addr_valid(ptr) will return true
on 64-bit Book3E, which leads to the panic.
As commit 4dd7554a6456 ("powerpc/64: Add VIRTUAL_BUG_ON checks for __va
and __pa addresses") does, make sure the virt addr above PAGE_OFFSET in
the virt_addr_valid() for 64-bit, also add upper limit check to make
sure the virt is below high_memory.
Meanwhile, for 32-bit PAGE_OFFSET is the virtual address of the start
of lowmem, high_memory is the upper low virtual address, the check is
suitable for 32-bit, this will fix the issue mentioned in commit
602946ec2f90 ("powerpc: Set max_mapnr correctly") too.
On 32-bit there is a similar problem with high memory, that was fixed in
commit 602946ec2f90 ("powerpc: Set max_mapnr correctly"), but that
commit breaks highmem and needs to be reverted.
We can't easily fix __pa(), we have code that relies on its current
behaviour. So for now add extra checks to virt_addr_valid().
For 64-bit Book3S the extra checks are not necessary, the combination of
virt_to_pfn() and pfn_valid() should yield the correct result, but they
are harmless.
[mpe: Add additional change log detail] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: release correct delalloc amount in direct IO write path
Running generic/406 causes the following WARNING in btrfs_destroy_inode()
which tells there are outstanding extents left.
In btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write(), we reserve a temporary outstanding
extents with btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata() (or indirectly from
btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space(()). We then release the outstanding extents
with btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(). However, the "len" can be modified
in the COW case, which releases fewer outstanding extents than expected.
Fix it by calling btrfs_delalloc_release_extents() for the original length.
To reproduce the warning, the filesystem should be 1 GiB. It's
triggering a short-write, due to not being able to allocate a large
extent and instead allocating a smaller one.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 757 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:8848 btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1e6/0x210 [btrfs]
Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor lzo_compress
lzo_decompress raid6_pq zstd zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash zram
zsmalloc
CPU: 0 PID: 757 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8+ #101
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1e6/0x210 [btrfs]
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000327bda8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888100548b78 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000026900 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888100548b78
RBP: ffff888100548940 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810b48aba8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff8881004eb240 R12: ffff88810b48a800
R13: ffff88810b48ec08 R14: ffff88810b48ed00 R15: ffff888100490c68
FS: 00007f8549ea0b80(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f854a09e733 CR3: 000000010a2e9003 CR4: 0000000000370eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
destroy_inode+0x33/0x70
dispose_list+0x43/0x60
evict_inodes+0x161/0x1b0
generic_shutdown_super+0x2d/0x110
kill_anon_super+0xf/0x20
btrfs_kill_super+0xd/0x20 [btrfs]
deactivate_locked_super+0x27/0x90
cleanup_mnt+0x12c/0x180
task_work_run+0x54/0x80
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x152/0x160
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f854a000fb7 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86: fix clear_user_rep_good() exception handling annotation
This code no longer exists in mainline, because it was removed in
commit d2c95f9d6802 ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory
clearing") upstream.
However, rather than backport the full range of x86 memory clearing and
copying cleanups, fix the exception table annotation placement for the
final 'rep movsb' in clear_user_rep_good(): rather than pointing at the
actual instruction that did the user space access, it pointed to the
register move just before it.
That made sense from a code flow standpoint, but not from an actual
usage standpoint: it means that if user access takes an exception, the
exception handler won't actually find the instruction in the exception
tables.
As a result, rather than fixing it up and returning -EFAULT, it would
then turn it into a kernel oops report instead, something like:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000020081000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
...
RIP: 0010:clear_user_rep_good+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S:147
...
Call Trace:
__clear_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:103 [inline]
clear_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:124 [inline]
iov_iter_zero+0x709/0x1290 lib/iov_iter.c:800
iomap_dio_hole_iter fs/iomap/direct-io.c:389 [inline]
iomap_dio_iter fs/iomap/direct-io.c:440 [inline]
__iomap_dio_rw+0xe3d/0x1cd0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:601
iomap_dio_rw+0x40/0xa0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:689
ext4_dio_read_iter fs/ext4/file.c:94 [inline]
ext4_file_read_iter+0x4be/0x690 fs/ext4/file.c:145
call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2183 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e0/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:733
do_iter_read+0x2f2/0x750 fs/read_write.c:796
vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:916
do_preadv+0x1b6/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1008
__do_sys_preadv2 fs/read_write.c:1070 [inline]
__se_sys_preadv2 fs/read_write.c:1061 [inline]
__x64_sys_preadv2+0xef/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1061
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
which then looks like a filesystem bug rather than the incorrect
exception annotation that it is.
[ The alternative to this one-liner fix is to take the upstream series
that cleans this all up:
68674f94ffc9 ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for small memory copies")
20f3337d350c ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for small memory clearing")
adfcf4231b8c ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory copies")
* d2c95f9d6802 ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory clearing")
3639a535587d ("x86: move stac/clac from user copy routines into callers")
577e6a7fd50d ("x86: inline the 'rep movs' in user copies for the FSRM case")
8c9b6a88b7e2 ("x86: improve on the non-rep 'clear_user' function")
427fda2c8a49 ("x86: improve on the non-rep 'copy_user' function")
* e046fe5a36a9 ("x86: set FSRS automatically on AMD CPUs that have FSRM")
e1f2750edc4a ("x86: remove 'zerorest' argument from __copy_user_nocache()")
034ff37d3407 ("x86: rewrite '__copy_user_nocache' function")
with either the whole series or at a minimum the two marked commits
being needed to fix this issue ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix null-ptr-deref in unix_stream_sendpage().
Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng reported null-ptr-deref in unix_stream_sendpage()
with detailed analysis and a nice repro.
unix_stream_sendpage() tries to add data to the last skb in the peer's
recv queue without locking the queue.
If the peer's FD is passed to another socket and the socket's FD is
passed to the peer, there is a loop between them. If we close both
sockets without receiving FD, the sockets will be cleaned up by garbage
collection.
The garbage collection iterates such sockets and unlinks skb with
FD from the socket's receive queue under the queue's lock.
So, there is a race where unix_stream_sendpage() could access an skb
locklessly that is being released by garbage collection, resulting in
use-after-free.
To avoid the issue, unix_stream_sendpage() must lock the peer's recv
queue.
Note the issue does not exist in 6.5+ thanks to the recent sendpage()
refactoring.
This patch is originally written by Linus Torvalds.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff988004dd6870
PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 4 PID: 297 Comm: garbage_uaf Not tainted 6.1.46 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xa2/0x1e0
Code: c0 0f 84 32 01 00 00 41 83 fd ff 74 10 48 8b 00 48 c1 e8 3a 41 39 c5 0f 85 1c 01 00 00 41 8b 44 24 28 49 8b 3c 24 48 8d 4a 40 <49> 8b 1c 06 4c 89 f0 65 48 0f c7 0f 0f 94 c0 84 c0 74 a1 41 8b 44
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000079fac0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000070 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 000000000001a284
RDX: 000000000001a244 RSI: 0000000000400cc0 RDI: 000000000002eee0
RBP: 0000000000400cc0 R08: 0000000000400cc0 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888003970f00
R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: ffff988004dd6800 R15: 00000000000000e8
FS: 00007f174d6f3600(0000) GS:ffff88807db00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff988004dd6870 CR3: 00000000092be000 CR4: 00000000007506e0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f
? page_fault_oops+0xa9/0x1e0
? fixup_exception+0x1d/0x310
? exc_page_fault+0xa8/0x150
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xa2/0x1e0
? __alloc_skb+0x16c/0x1e0
__alloc_skb+0x16c/0x1e0
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x48/0x1e0
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x234/0x270
unix_stream_sendmsg+0x1f5/0x690
sock_sendmsg+0x5d/0x60
____sys_sendmsg+0x210/0x260
___sys_sendmsg+0x83/0xd0
? kmem_cache_alloc+0xc6/0x1c0
? avc_disable+0x20/0x20
? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x53/0xc0
? alloc_empty_file+0x5d/0xb0
? alloc_file+0x91/0x170
? alloc_file_pseudo+0x94/0x100
? __fget_light+0x9f/0x120
__sys_sendmsg+0x54/0xa0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x69/0xd3
RIP: 0033:0x7f174d639a7d
Code: 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 8a c1 f4 ff 8b 54 24 1c 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 de c1 f4 ff 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcb563ea50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f174d639a7d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcb563eab0 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007ffcb563eb10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: 00000000004040a0 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007ffcb563ec28
R13: 0000000000401398 R14: 0000000000403e00 R15: 00007f174d72c000
</TASK> |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/fpu: Re-add exception handling in load_fpu_state()
With the recent rewrite of the fpu code exception handling for the
lfpc instruction within load_fpu_state() was erroneously removed.
Add it again to prevent that loading invalid floating point register
values cause an unhandled specification exception. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/surface: aggregator: Add missing call to ssam_request_sync_free()
Although rare, ssam_request_sync_init() can fail. In that case, the
request should be freed via ssam_request_sync_free(). Currently it is
leaked instead. Fix this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpiolib: acpi: initialize acpi_gpio_info struct
Since commit 7c010d463372 ("gpiolib: acpi: Make sure we fill struct
acpi_gpio_info"), uninitialized acpi_gpio_info struct are passed to
__acpi_find_gpio() and later in the call stack info->quirks is used in
acpi_populate_gpio_lookup. This breaks the i2c_hid_cpi driver:
[ 58.122916] i2c_hid_acpi i2c-UNIW0001:00: HID over i2c has not been provided an Int IRQ
[ 58.123097] i2c_hid_acpi i2c-UNIW0001:00: probe with driver i2c_hid_acpi failed with error -22
Fix this by initializing the acpi_gpio_info pass to __acpi_find_gpio() |
