| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| When API audit logging is enabled, the middleware reads the entire HTTP request body into memory without enforcing a size limit on login endpoints. Because the audit middleware is positioned earlier in the handler chain than Rancher's APIBodyLimitingHandler, the body-size cap (default 1 MiB) is bypassed for requests that pass through the audit copyReqBody path. An unauthenticated attacker can send arbitrarily large request bodies to the public login endpoints, causing the Rancher Manager server process to allocate memory proportional to the supplied body size. With just a few concurrent connections, this can exhaust available memory and terminate the Rancher Manager plane process, making the Rancher API and UI unavailable and interrupting management of all downstream clusters. |
| Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. |
| Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in .NET Framework allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. |
| Perspective 5.0.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows remote attackers to block the server event loop indefinitely by submitting a crafted expression containing unbounded for or while loop constructs in a TableMakeViewReq message. Attackers can embed an arbitrarily large iteration count in an expression column evaluated once per table row, causing the Tornado IOLoop to block without any iteration cap, deadline, or cancellation check, rendering the server unresponsive to all connected clients. |
| Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. |
| Socket.IO enables bidirectional and low-latency communication for every platform. Prior to 4.2.7, 3.4.5, and 3.3.6, a specially crafted Socket.IO packet can make the server wait for a large number of binary attachments and buffer them, which can be exploited to make the server run out of memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.7, 3.4.5, and 3.3.6. |
| An authenticated attacker could exceed the session flow control incoming window potentially leading to denial of service.
This issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-J: through 0.34.1.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.35.0, which fixes the issue. |
| A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type nesting to cause a StackOverflowError potentially leading to denial of service.
This issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-J: through 0.34.1.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.35.0, which fixes the issue. |
| A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type size/count handling to cause excessive allocation leading to potential denial of service.
This issue affects Apache Qpid Broker-J: through 10.0.1.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.1.0, which fixes the issue. |
| The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for CVE-2026-18401 (GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq, number length constraint bypass in the non-blocking parser) is incomplete. This record covers the remaining bypass.
The earlier fix wired validateIntegerLength() into a new _setIntLength() helper and invoked it wherever the integer portion of a number is decided: a terminator byte arrives, a '.' or 'e'/'E' is seen, or input ends inside a fully buffered value. It was not invoked on the attacker-relevant path where the parser runs out of input while still inside the MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS minor state and returns NOT_AVAILABLE to the caller.
As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, keeps the parser inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS indefinitely. _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() grows the accumulator on every chunk while validateIntegerLength() is never called. The accumulator is bounded only by maxStringLength (20 MiB by default) rather than by maxNumberLength (1000 by default), an amplification of roughly 20,000x over the documented limit. Because Java char values occupy two bytes, a single connection can be driven to approximately 40 MiB of heap before the validator finally fires when the value completes.
The equivalent fraction-path code is correct: _finishFloatFraction() calls _setFractLength() before its NOT_AVAILABLE return. The missing call affects the integer-digit paths in _startPositiveNumber(), _startNegativeNumber() and _finishNumberIntegralPart() in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.
Impact: reactive frameworks such as Spring WebFlux/Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon and Vert.x feed inbound HTTP or gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive, which is precisely the chunked-feed shape required. Operators who set StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength expecting it to cap memory per number value do not get that guarantee; memory accumulates per concurrent connection and attacker-controlled concurrency can exhaust the JVM heap. The synchronous parsers (UTF8StreamJsonParser, ReaderBasedJsonParser) and the async parser operating on complete input are not affected.
Exploitation requires only the ability to stream data to a parsing endpoint; no privileges or user interaction are needed.
This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.7, and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.3, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.1.3. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9 states the affected 2.x range without a lower bound. The 2.22.x and 3.2.x release lines are not affected: those branches were created after the fix commit landed on 2026-05-21 and therefore contain it from their initial releases (2.22.0, tagged 2026-06-03, and 3.2.0, tagged 2026-06-08). |
| When using the "tarfile" module with a file opened in "streaming mode" (mode="r|") the tarfile module did not properly handle EOF, making archive parsing take exponentially longer. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Starting in version 4.2.0.Final and prior to version 4.2.15.Final, a memory exhaustion vulnerability in the Netty HTTP/3 codec allows the creation of an infinite number of blocked streams, which can cause OOM error. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue. |
| The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service.
The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses.
Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path.
Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (for example a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application) can cause unbounded allocation in the TextBuffer and an OutOfMemoryError. If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM may additionally be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing, causing CPU-based denial of service.
No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.
This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.5 and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.0.x.
Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq records the lower bound of the affected 2.x range as 2.0.0. |
| NVIDIA DCGM Exporter for all platforms contains a vulnerability in the /debug/pprof endpoints, where an attacker could cause uncontrolled resource consumption by submitting concurrent unauthenticated profiling requests. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service and information disclosure. |
| Elgg before 7.0.0 does not check image dimensions to prevent denial of service via a large avatar upload. |
| The brace-expansion library generates arbitrary strings containing a common prefix and suffix. Prior to 1.1.18, 2.1.4, 3.0.6, and 5.0.9, expand() does not apply maxLength while constructing comma-alternative intermediate arrays or padded sequences, allowing attacker-controlled input to exhaust memory or block the event loop. The fix for CVE-2026-14257 is bypassed by the vulnerability. This issue is fixed in versions 1.1.18, 2.1.4, 3.0.6, and 5.0.9. |
| axios versions 0.28.0 and later contain uncontrolled recursion in formDataToJSON when processing FormData field names with deeply nested bracket segments. Attackers can supply FormData with field names containing thousands of nested brackets to exhaust the JavaScript call stack and trigger RangeError, causing request failure or process termination in applications that do not handle the exception. |
| FreeRDP before 3.29.0 fails to enforce the RESPONSE_SIZE_LIMIT when processing Transfer-Encoding: chunked HTTP responses in http_response_recv_body(). Attackers controlling a malicious RD Gateway endpoint can send oversized chunked response bodies to exhaust client memory resources without triggering the configured size limit. |
| guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 contain a denial of service vulnerability in the CookieJar that accepts unlimited Set-Cookie header fields with no size restrictions. Attackers can return many large cookies from a malicious server, causing Guzzle to store excessive data in memory and generate oversized Cookie headers that fail in handlers or destination servers. |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-influenced binary input.
Guardian.Plug.Keys derives connection and session namespace keys by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. base_key/1 in lib/guardian/plug/keys.ex converts any binary into the atom :"guardian_<input>", and the derived helpers claims_key/1, resource_key/1, and token_key/1 create a second atom on top of that. key_from_other/1 likewise converts a regex-captured binary through String.to_atom/1. The public specs advertise String.t() as a valid argument, so passing a string is documented usage, and higher-level entry points such as Guardian.Plug.current_token(conn, key: key) thread the caller-supplied key straight into these functions.
String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that routes attacker-influenced data (a tenant identifier, header, or other request input) into a Guardian key therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node, taking down every application running on it.
This issue affects guardian: from 0.1.0 before 2.4.1. |
