| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix use-after-free in ext4_orphan_cleanup
I caught a issue as follows:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0x28/0x1a0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88814b13f378 by task mount/710
CPU: 1 PID: 710 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3-next #370
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9f
print_report+0x25d/0x759
kasan_report+0xc0/0x120
__asan_load8+0x99/0x140
__list_add_valid+0x28/0x1a0
ext4_orphan_cleanup+0x564/0x9d0 [ext4]
__ext4_fill_super+0x48e2/0x5300 [ext4]
ext4_fill_super+0x19f/0x3a0 [ext4]
get_tree_bdev+0x27b/0x450
ext4_get_tree+0x19/0x30 [ext4]
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x150
path_mount+0xaae/0x1350
do_mount+0xe2/0x110
__x64_sys_mount+0xf0/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
</TASK>
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
ext4_fill_super
ext4_orphan_cleanup
--- loop1: assume last_orphan is 12 ---
list_add(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_orphan)
ext4_truncate --> return 0
ext4_inode_attach_jinode --> return -ENOMEM
iput(inode) --> free inode<12>
--- loop2: last_orphan is still 12 ---
list_add(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_orphan);
// use inode<12> and trigger UAF
To solve this issue, we need to propagate the return value of
ext4_inode_attach_jinode() appropriately. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption
When manipulating xattr blocks, we can deadlock infinitely looping
inside ext4_xattr_block_set() where we constantly keep finding xattr
block for reuse in mbcache but we are unable to reuse it because its
reference count is too big. This happens because cache entry for the
xattr block is marked as reusable (e_reusable set) although its
reference count is too big. When this inconsistency happens, this
inconsistent state is kept indefinitely and so ext4_xattr_block_set()
keeps retrying indefinitely.
The inconsistent state is caused by non-atomic update of e_reusable bit.
e_reusable is part of a bitfield and e_reusable update can race with
update of e_referenced bit in the same bitfield resulting in loss of one
of the updates. Fix the problem by using atomic bitops instead.
This bug has been around for many years, but it became *much* easier
to hit after commit 65f8b80053a1 ("ext4: fix race when reusing xattr
blocks"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Fix QP destroy to wait for all references dropped.
Delay QP destroy completion until all siw references to QP are
dropped. The calling RDMA core will free QP structure after
successful return from siw_qp_destroy() call, so siw must not
hold any remaining reference to the QP upon return.
A use-after-free was encountered in xfstest generic/460, while
testing NFSoRDMA. Here, after a TCP connection drop by peer,
the triggered siw_cm_work_handler got delayed until after
QP destroy call, referencing a QP which has already freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix failed to find the peer with peer_id 0 when disconnected
It has a fail log which is ath11k_dbg in ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status(),
as below, it will not print when debug_mask is not set ATH11K_DBG_DATA.
ath11k_dbg(ab, ATH11K_DBG_DATA,
"failed to find the peer with peer_id %d\n",
ppdu_info.peer_id);
When run scan with station disconnected, the peer_id is 0 for case
HAL_RX_MPDU_START in ath11k_hal_rx_parse_mon_status_tlv() which called
from ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status(), and the peer_id of ppdu_info is
reset to 0 in the while loop, so it does not match condition of the
check "if (ppdu_info->peer_id == HAL_INVALID_PEERID" in the loop, and
then the log "failed to find the peer with peer_id 0" print after the
check in the loop, it is below call stack when debug_mask is set
ATH11K_DBG_DATA.
The reason is this commit 01d2f285e3e5 ("ath11k: decode HE status tlv")
add "memset(ppdu_info, 0, sizeof(struct hal_rx_mon_ppdu_info))" in
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status(), but the commit does not initialize
the peer_id to HAL_INVALID_PEERID, then lead the check mis-match.
Callstack of the failed log:
[12335.689072] RIP: 0010:ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status+0x9ea/0x1020 [ath11k]
[12335.689157] Code: 89 ff e8 f9 10 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 f7 e8 dc 4b 4e de 48 8b 85 38 ff ff ff c7 80 e4 07 00 00 01 00 00 00 e9 20 f8 ff ff <0f> 0b 41 0f b7 96 be 06 00 00 48 c7 c6 b8 50 44 c1 4c 89 ff e8 fd
[12335.689180] RSP: 0018:ffffb874001a4ca0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[12335.689210] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff995642cbd100 RCX: 0000000000000000
[12335.689229] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff99564212cd18
[12335.689248] RBP: ffffb874001a4dc0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[12335.689268] R10: 0000000000000220 R11: ffffb874001a48e8 R12: ffff995642473d40
[12335.689286] R13: ffff99564212c5b8 R14: ffff9956424736a0 R15: ffff995642120000
[12335.689303] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff995739000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[12335.689323] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[12335.689341] CR2: 00007f43c5d5e039 CR3: 000000011c012005 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[12335.689360] Call Trace:
[12335.689377] <IRQ>
[12335.689418] ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0x12/0x50
[12335.689447] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x25/0x80
[12335.689471] ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0x12/0x50
[12335.689504] ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x8d/0x4f0 [ath11k]
[12335.689578] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x8d/0x4f0 [ath11k]
[12335.689653] ? lock_acquire+0xef/0x360
[12335.689681] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x25/0x80
[12335.689713] ath11k_dp_service_mon_ring+0x38/0x60 [ath11k]
[12335.689784] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x4f0/0x4f0 [ath11k]
[12335.689860] call_timer_fn+0xb2/0x2f0
[12335.689897] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x4f0/0x4f0 [ath11k]
[12335.689970] run_timer_softirq+0x21f/0x540
[12335.689999] ? ktime_get+0xad/0x160
[12335.690025] ? lapic_next_deadline+0x2c/0x40
[12335.690053] ? clockevents_program_event+0x82/0x100
[12335.690093] __do_softirq+0x151/0x4a8
[12335.690135] irq_exit_rcu+0xc9/0x100
[12335.690165] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa8/0xd0
[12335.690189] </IRQ>
[12335.690204] <TASK>
[12335.690225] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
Reset the default value to HAL_INVALID_PEERID each time after memset
of ppdu_info as well as others memset which existed in function
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status(), then the failed log disappeared.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: pn533: Clear nfc_target before being used
Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read that occurs in nla_put() called from
nfc_genl_send_target() when target->sensb_res_len, which is duplicated
from an nfc_target in pn533, is too large as the nfc_target is not
properly initialized and retains garbage values. Clear nfc_targets with
memset() before they are used.
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put
Call Trace:
memcpy
nla_put
nfc_genl_dump_targets
genl_lock_dumpit
netlink_dump
__netlink_dump_start
genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit
genl_rcv_msg
netlink_rcv_skb
genl_rcv
netlink_unicast
netlink_sendmsg
sock_sendmsg
____sys_sendmsg
___sys_sendmsg
__sys_sendmsg
do_syscall_64 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: hugetlb: fix UAF in hugetlb_handle_userfault
The vma_lock and hugetlb_fault_mutex are dropped before handling userfault
and reacquire them again after handle_userfault(), but reacquire the
vma_lock could lead to UAF[1,2] due to the following race,
hugetlb_fault
hugetlb_no_page
/*unlock vma_lock */
hugetlb_handle_userfault
handle_userfault
/* unlock mm->mmap_lock*/
vm_mmap_pgoff
do_mmap
mmap_region
munmap_vma_range
/* clean old vma */
/* lock vma_lock again <--- UAF */
/* unlock vma_lock */
Since the vma_lock will unlock immediately after
hugetlb_handle_userfault(), let's drop the unneeded lock and unlock in
hugetlb_handle_userfault() to fix the issue.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/000000000000d5e00a05e834962e@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220921014457.1668-1-liuzixian4@huawei.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fpga: prevent integer overflow in dfl_feature_ioctl_set_irq()
The "hdr.count * sizeof(s32)" multiplication can overflow on 32 bit
systems leading to memory corruption. Use array_size() to fix that. |
| Insufficient policy enforcement in Network in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed an attacker in a privileged network position to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Certificate in Google Chrome on Linux prior to 150.0.7871.182 allowed an attacker in a privileged network position to perform domain spoofing via malicious network traffic. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: elan_i2c - prevent division by zero and arithmetic underflow
The Elan I2C touchpad driver queries the device for its physical
dimensions and trace counts to calculate the device resolution and width.
However, if the device firmware or device tree provides invalid zero
values for x_traces or y_traces, it results in a fatal division-by-zero
exception leading to a kernel panic during device probe.
Add checks to ensure these parameters are non-zero before performing
the division. If invalid trace values are detected, fall back to a safe
default of 1.
Additionally, prevent an arithmetic underflow in the touch reporting
logic. Previously, if the calculated or fallback width was smaller than
ETP_FWIDTH_REDUCE (90), the subtraction would underflow, resulting in a
massive unsigned integer being reported to userspace. Clamp the adjusted
width to a minimum of 0 to safely handle small physical dimensions and
fallback scenarios.
Completing the probe with safe fallback values ensures the sysfs nodes
are created, keeping the firmware update path intact so a recovery
firmware can be flashed to the device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Break the loop on failure in iommufd_fault_fops_read()
On a copy_to_user() failure inside the inner list_for_each_entry, only the
inner loop breaks; the outer while re-fetches the just-restored fault group
and retries the failing copy_to_user() forever, spinning the reader at 100%
CPU with fault->mutex held.
Check rc after the inner loop and break the outer while as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfs/hfsplus: zero-initialize buffer in hfs_bnode_read
hfs_bnode_read() can return early without writing to the output buffer
when is_bnode_offset_valid() fails or when check_and_correct_requested_
length() corrects the length to zero. Callers such as hfs_bnode_read_
u16() and hfs_bnode_read_u8() pass stack-allocated buffers and use the
result unconditionally, leading to KMSAN uninit-value reports.
Rather than initializing at each individual call site, zero the buffer
at the start of hfs_bnode_read() before any validation checks. This
ensures all callers in both hfs and hfsplus get a deterministic zero
value regardless of which early-return path is taken. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtksdio: fix infinite loop in btmtksdio_txrx_work()
Every once in a while we see a hung btmtksdio_flush() task:
INFO: task kworker/u17:0:189 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
__cancel_work_timer+0x3f4/0x460
cancel_work_sync+0x1c/0x2c
btmtksdio_flush+0x2c/0x40
hci_dev_open_sync+0x10c4/0x2190
[..]
It all boils down to incorrect time_is_before_jiffies() usage in
btmtksdio_txrx_work(). The btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop is expected
to be terminated if running for longer than 5*HZ. However the
timeout check is twisted: time_is_before_jiffies(old_jiffies + 5*HZ)
evaluates to true when old_jiffies + 5*HZ is in the past i.e. when a
timeout has occurred. Using OR with time_is_before_jiffies(txrx_timeout)
means that:
- before the 5-second timeout: the condition is `int_status || false`,
so it loops as long as there are pending interrupts.
- after the 5-second timeout: the condition becomes `int_status || true`,
which is always true.
When the loop becomes infinite btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop never
terminates and never releases the SDIO host.
Fix loop termination condition to actually enforce a 5*HZ timeout. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_pci: fix vq info pointer lookup via wrong index
Unbinding a virtio balloon device:
echo virtio0 > /sys/bus/virtio/drivers/virtio_balloon/unbind
triggers a NULL pointer dereference. The dmesg says:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[...]
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x5/0xf0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vp_del_vqs+0x121/0x230
remove_common+0x135/0x150
virtballoon_remove+0xee/0x100
virtio_dev_remove+0x3b/0x80
device_release_driver_internal+0x187/0x2c0
unbind_store+0xb9/0xe0
kernfs_fop_write_iter.llvm.11660790530567441834+0xf6/0x180
vfs_write+0x2a9/0x3b0
ksys_write+0x5c/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x54/0x230
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x29/0x31
[...]
</TASK>
The virtio_balloon device registers 5 queues (inflate, deflate, stats,
free_page, reporting) but only the first two are unconditional. The
stats, free_page and reporting queues are each conditional on their
respective feature bits. When any of these features are absent, the
corresponding vqs_info entry has name == NULL, creating holes in the
array.
The root cause is an indexing mismatch introduced when vq info storage
was changed to be passed as an argument. vp_find_vqs_msix() and
vp_find_vqs_intx() store the info pointer at vp_dev->vqs[i], where 'i'
is the caller's sparse array index. However, the virtqueue itself gets
vq->index assigned from queue_idx, a dense index that skips NULL
entries. When holes exist, 'i' and queue_idx diverge. Later,
vp_del_vqs() looks up info via vp_dev->vqs[vq->index] using the dense
index into the sparsely-populated array, and hits NULL.
Fix this by storing info at vp_dev->vqs[queue_idx] instead of
vp_dev->vqs[i], so the store index matches the lookup index
(vq->index). Apply the fix to both the MSIX and INTX paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on marvell probe failure
Make sure to stop any TX URBs submitted during Marvell OOB wakeup
configuration on later probe failures to avoid use-after-free in the
completion callback.
This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing a fix for a wakeup
source leak in the btusb probe errors paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: lpc32xx: Initialize completion before requesting IRQ
In the report from Jaeyoung Chung:
"lpc32xx_adc_probe() in drivers/iio/adc/lpc32xx_adc.c registers its
interrupt handler with devm_request_irq() before it initializes
st->completion with init_completion(). If an interrupt arrives after
devm_request_irq() and before init_completion(), the handler calls
complete() on an uninitialized completion, causing a kernel panic.
The probe path, in lpc32xx_adc_probe():
iodev = devm_iio_device_alloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*st)); /* st kzalloc-zeroed */
...
retval = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq, lpc32xx_adc_isr, 0,
LPC32XXAD_NAME, st); /* register handler */
...
init_completion(&st->completion); /* initialize completion */
lpc32xx_adc_isr() calls complete():
complete(&st->completion);
If the device raises an interrupt before init_completion() runs,
complete() acquires the uninitialized wait.lock and walks the zeroed
task_list in swake_up_locked(). The zeroed task_list makes list_empty()
return false, so swake_up_locked() dereferences a NULL list entry,
triggering a KASAN wild-memory-access."
Fix the chance of a spurious IRQ causing an uninitialized pointer
dereference by moving init_completion() above devm_request_irq(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: function: rndis: add length check for header
Add a length check for the rndis header in rndis_rm_hdr, to ensure that
MessageType, MessageLength, DataOffset, and DataLength fields are
present before they are accessed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: correct drop logic for malformed AMPDU frames
The previous commit aims to fix issue caused by malformed AMPDU frames.
But the drop logic fails to deal with the first AMPDU packet paired with
certain range of sequence number, and leads to unexpected packet drop.
It is more likely to encounter this failure when there are busy traffic
during rekey process and could lead to disconnection from the AP.
Fix this by adding a initial state judgement and only reset status
during pairwise rekey. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Fix infinite loop in layout state revocation
find_one_sb_stid() skips stids whose sc_status is non-zero, but the
SC_TYPE_LAYOUT case in nfsd4_revoke_states() never sets sc_status
before calling nfsd4_close_layout(). The retry loop therefore finds
the same layout stid on every iteration, hanging the revoker
indefinitely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: move policy_bydst RCU sync from per-netns .exit to .pre_exit
The struct pernet_operations docstring in include/net/net_namespace.h
explicitly warns against blocking RCU primitives in .exit handlers:
Exit methods using blocking RCU primitives, such as
synchronize_rcu(), should be implemented via exit_batch.
[...]
Please, avoid synchronize_rcu() at all, where it's possible.
Note that a combination of pre_exit() and exit() can
be used, since a synchronize_rcu() is guaranteed between
the calls.
xfrm_policy_fini() violates this: it calls synchronize_rcu() before
freeing the policy_bydst hash tables (so no RCU reader is mid-
traversal at free time), but runs from xfrm_net_ops.exit -- once per
namespace -- so a cleanup_net() of N namespaces pays N full RCU
grace periods serially.
Use the documented pre_exit/exit split. Move the policy flush (and
the workqueue drains it depends on) into a new .pre_exit handler;
xfrm_policy_fini() then runs in .exit and frees the hash tables
after the synchronize_rcu_expedited() that cleanup_net() guarantees
between the two phases. Providing O(1) RCU grace periods per batch
instead of O(N).
Observed on Linux 6.18 with a workload doing unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)
at ~13/sec sustained: cleanup_net() and the netns_wq rescuer kthread
both stuck in xfrm_policy_fini()'s synchronize_rcu(), >300k struct
net accumulated in the cleanup queue, Percpu in /proc/meminfo climbed
to 130+ GB on 256-CPU hosts, and memcg OOMs followed. setup_net and
__put_net counts were balanced, ruling out a refcount leak. |
