| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Take return from set_memory_ro() into account with bpf_prog_lock_ro()
set_memory_ro() can fail, leaving memory unprotected.
Check its return and take it into account as an error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix NULL pointer dereference in gfs2_log_flush
In gfs2_jindex_free(), set sdp->sd_jdesc to NULL under the log flush
lock to provide exclusion against gfs2_log_flush().
In gfs2_log_flush(), check if sdp->sd_jdesc is non-NULL before
dereferencing it. Otherwise, we could run into a NULL pointer
dereference when outstanding glock work races with an unmount
(glock_work_func -> run_queue -> do_xmote -> inode_go_sync ->
gfs2_log_flush). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Fix potential integer overflow in page size calculation
Explicitly cast tbo->page_alignment to u64 before bit-shifting to
prevent overflow when assigning to min_page_size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Skip pipe if the pipe idx not set properly
[why]
Driver crashes when pipe idx not set properly
[how]
Add code to skip the pipe that idx not set properly |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Add a NULL check in xe_ttm_stolen_mgr_init
Add an explicit check to ensure that the mgr is not NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Fix possible double free in error handling path
When auxiliary_device_add() returns error and then calls
auxiliary_device_uninit(), callback function adev_release
calls kfree(madev). We shouldn't call kfree(madev) again
in the error handling path. Set 'madev' to NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Take return from set_memory_rox() into account with bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro()
set_memory_rox() can fail, leaving memory unprotected.
Check return and bail out when bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro() returns
an error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: fully validate NFT_DATA_VALUE on store to data registers
register store validation for NFT_DATA_VALUE is conditional, however,
the datatype is always either NFT_DATA_VALUE or NFT_DATA_VERDICT. This
only requires a new helper function to infer the register type from the
set datatype so this conditional check can be removed. Otherwise,
pointer to chain object can be leaked through the registers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf
The BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular
buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the
consumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the
data, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of
data reserved by all producers.
Each time a record is reserved, the producer that "owns" the record will
successfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is
read, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished
processing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user
space, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.
One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both
producers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously
back-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures
for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data
area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page
again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual
memory.
Each record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for
book-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.
Helpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`
for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however
possible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first
chunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk's
header.
For example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size
of 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to
bpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in
[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets
allocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_pos
was edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos > rb->mask`
check. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able
to edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned
earlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data
pages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A's header.
bpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header's pg_off to then
locate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunk
B modified chunk A's header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrong
page and could cause a crash.
Fix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the range
from the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring
buffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We've tested with
the ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)
before/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it
is still not significantly enough to matter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix too early release of tcx_entry
Pedro Pinto and later independently also Hyunwoo Kim and Wongi Lee reported
an issue that the tcx_entry can be released too early leading to a use
after free (UAF) when an active old-style ingress or clsact qdisc with a
shared tc block is later replaced by another ingress or clsact instance.
Essentially, the sequence to trigger the UAF (one example) can be as follows:
1. A network namespace is created
2. An ingress qdisc is created. This allocates a tcx_entry, and
&tcx_entry->miniq is stored in the qdisc's miniqp->p_miniq. At the
same time, a tcf block with index 1 is created.
3. chain0 is attached to the tcf block. chain0 must be connected to
the block linked to the ingress qdisc to later reach the function
tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del() which triggers the UAF.
4. Create and graft a clsact qdisc. This causes the ingress qdisc
created in step 1 to be removed, thus freeing the previously linked
tcx_entry:
rtnetlink_rcv_msg()
=> tc_modify_qdisc()
=> qdisc_create()
=> clsact_init() [a]
=> qdisc_graft()
=> qdisc_destroy()
=> __qdisc_destroy()
=> ingress_destroy() [b]
=> tcx_entry_free()
=> kfree_rcu() // tcx_entry freed
5. Finally, the network namespace is closed. This registers the
cleanup_net worker, and during the process of releasing the
remaining clsact qdisc, it accesses the tcx_entry that was
already freed in step 4, causing the UAF to occur:
cleanup_net()
=> ops_exit_list()
=> default_device_exit_batch()
=> unregister_netdevice_many()
=> unregister_netdevice_many_notify()
=> dev_shutdown()
=> qdisc_put()
=> clsact_destroy() [c]
=> tcf_block_put_ext()
=> tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del()
=> tcf_chain_head_change_item()
=> clsact_chain_head_change()
=> mini_qdisc_pair_swap() // UAF
There are also other variants, the gist is to add an ingress (or clsact)
qdisc with a specific shared block, then to replace that qdisc, waiting
for the tcx_entry kfree_rcu() to be executed and subsequently accessing
the current active qdisc's miniq one way or another.
The correct fix is to turn the miniq_active boolean into a counter. What
can be observed, at step 2 above, the counter transitions from 0->1, at
step [a] from 1->2 (in order for the miniq object to remain active during
the replacement), then in [b] from 2->1 and finally [c] 1->0 with the
eventual release. The reference counter in general ranges from [0,2] and
it does not need to be atomic since all access to the counter is protected
by the rtnl mutex. With this in place, there is no longer a UAF happening
and the tcx_entry is freed at the correct time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: fix use-after-free case in tcpm_register_source_caps
There could be a potential use-after-free case in
tcpm_register_source_caps(). This could happen when:
* new (say invalid) source caps are advertised
* the existing source caps are unregistered
* tcpm_register_source_caps() returns with an error as
usb_power_delivery_register_capabilities() fails
This causes port->partner_source_caps to hold on to the now freed source
caps.
Reset port->partner_source_caps value to NULL after unregistering
existing source caps. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid5: fix deadlock that raid5d() wait for itself to clear MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING
Xiao reported that lvm2 test lvconvert-raid-takeover.sh can hang with
small possibility, the root cause is exactly the same as commit
bed9e27baf52 ("Revert "md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d"")
However, Dan reported another hang after that, and junxiao investigated
the problem and found out that this is caused by plugged bio can't issue
from raid5d().
Current implementation in raid5d() has a weird dependence:
1) md_check_recovery() from raid5d() must hold 'reconfig_mutex' to clear
MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING;
2) raid5d() handles IO in a deadloop, until all IO are issued;
3) IO from raid5d() must wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING to be cleared;
This behaviour is introduce before v2.6, and for consequence, if other
context hold 'reconfig_mutex', and md_check_recovery() can't update
super_block, then raid5d() will waste one cpu 100% by the deadloop, until
'reconfig_mutex' is released.
Refer to the implementation from raid1 and raid10, fix this problem by
skipping issue IO if MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING is still set after
md_check_recovery(), daemon thread will be woken up when 'reconfig_mutex'
is released. Meanwhile, the hang problem will be fixed as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmalloc: fix vmalloc which may return null if called with __GFP_NOFAIL
commit a421ef303008 ("mm: allow !GFP_KERNEL allocations for kvmalloc")
includes support for __GFP_NOFAIL, but it presents a conflict with commit
dd544141b9eb ("vmalloc: back off when the current task is OOM-killed"). A
possible scenario is as follows:
process-a
__vmalloc_node_range(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL)
__vmalloc_area_node()
vm_area_alloc_pages()
--> oom-killer send SIGKILL to process-a
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) break;
--> return NULL;
To fix this, do not check fatal_signal_pending() in vm_area_alloc_pages()
if __GFP_NOFAIL set.
This issue occurred during OPLUS KASAN TEST. Below is part of the log
-> oom-killer sends signal to process
[65731.222840] [ T1308] oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_NONE,nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0,global_oom,task_memcg=/apps/uid_10198,task=gs.intelligence,pid=32454,uid=10198
[65731.259685] [T32454] Call trace:
[65731.259698] [T32454] dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x118
[65731.259734] [T32454] show_stack+0x18/0x24
[65731.259756] [T32454] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x7c
[65731.259781] [T32454] dump_stack+0x18/0x38
[65731.259800] [T32454] mrdump_common_die+0x250/0x39c [mrdump]
[65731.259936] [T32454] ipanic_die+0x20/0x34 [mrdump]
[65731.260019] [T32454] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xb4/0xfc
[65731.260047] [T32454] notify_die+0x114/0x198
[65731.260073] [T32454] die+0xf4/0x5b4
[65731.260098] [T32454] die_kernel_fault+0x80/0x98
[65731.260124] [T32454] __do_kernel_fault+0x160/0x2a8
[65731.260146] [T32454] do_bad_area+0x68/0x148
[65731.260174] [T32454] do_mem_abort+0x151c/0x1b34
[65731.260204] [T32454] el1_abort+0x3c/0x5c
[65731.260227] [T32454] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x54/0x90
[65731.260248] [T32454] el1h_64_sync+0x68/0x6c
[65731.260269] [T32454] z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x7f0/0x2258
--> be->decompressed_pages = kvcalloc(be->nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
kernel panic by NULL pointer dereference.
erofs assume kvmalloc with __GFP_NOFAIL never return NULL.
[65731.260293] [T32454] z_erofs_runqueue+0xf30/0x104c
[65731.260314] [T32454] z_erofs_readahead+0x4f0/0x968
[65731.260339] [T32454] read_pages+0x170/0xadc
[65731.260364] [T32454] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x874/0xf30
[65731.260388] [T32454] page_cache_ra_order+0x24c/0x714
[65731.260411] [T32454] filemap_fault+0xbf0/0x1a74
[65731.260437] [T32454] __do_fault+0xd0/0x33c
[65731.260462] [T32454] handle_mm_fault+0xf74/0x3fe0
[65731.260486] [T32454] do_mem_abort+0x54c/0x1b34
[65731.260509] [T32454] el0_da+0x44/0x94
[65731.260531] [T32454] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xb4
[65731.260553] [T32454] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cppc_cpufreq: Fix possible null pointer dereference
cppc_cpufreq_get_rate() and hisi_cppc_cpufreq_get_rate() can be called from
different places with various parameters. So cpufreq_cpu_get() can return
null as 'policy' in some circumstances.
Fix this bug by adding null return check.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix potential glock use-after-free on unmount
When a DLM lockspace is released and there ares still locks in that
lockspace, DLM will unlock those locks automatically. Commit
fb6791d100d1b started exploiting this behavior to speed up filesystem
unmount: gfs2 would simply free glocks it didn't want to unlock and then
release the lockspace. This didn't take the bast callbacks for
asynchronous lock contention notifications into account, which remain
active until until a lock is unlocked or its lockspace is released.
To prevent those callbacks from accessing deallocated objects, put the
glocks that should not be unlocked on the sd_dead_glocks list, release
the lockspace, and only then free those glocks.
As an additional measure, ignore unexpected ast and bast callbacks if
the receiving glock is dead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: fix list corruption from reorder of WRITE ->lqueued
__blkcg_rstat_flush() can be run anytime, especially when blk_cgroup_bio_start
is being executed.
If WRITE of `->lqueued` is re-ordered with READ of 'bisc->lnode.next' in
the loop of __blkcg_rstat_flush(), `next_bisc` can be assigned with one
stat instance being added in blk_cgroup_bio_start(), then the local
list in __blkcg_rstat_flush() could be corrupted.
Fix the issue by adding one barrier. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before exit_net release
Similar to 2c9f0293280e ("netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy
work before netlink notifier") to address a race between exit_net and
the destroy workqueue.
The trace below shows an element to be released via destroy workqueue
while exit_net path (triggered via module removal) has already released
the set that is used in such transaction.
[ 1360.547789] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables]
[ 1360.547861] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888140500cc0 by task kworker/4:1/152465
[ 1360.547870] CPU: 4 PID: 152465 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.8.0+ #359
[ 1360.547882] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work [nf_tables]
[ 1360.547984] Call Trace:
[ 1360.547991] <TASK>
[ 1360.547998] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
[ 1360.548014] print_report+0xc4/0x610
[ 1360.548026] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xba/0x160
[ 1360.548040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 1360.548054] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables]
[ 1360.548176] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
[ 1360.548189] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables]
[ 1360.548312] nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables]
[ 1360.548447] ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables]
[ 1360.548577] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x18/0x30
[ 1360.548591] process_one_work+0x2f1/0x670
[ 1360.548610] worker_thread+0x4d3/0x760
[ 1360.548627] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 1360.548640] kthread+0x16b/0x1b0
[ 1360.548653] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1360.548665] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
[ 1360.548679] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1360.548690] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 1360.548707] </TASK>
[ 1360.548719] Allocated by task 192061:
[ 1360.548726] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
[ 1360.548739] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 1360.548750] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
[ 1360.548760] __kmalloc_node+0x1f1/0x450
[ 1360.548771] nf_tables_newset+0x10c7/0x1b50 [nf_tables]
[ 1360.548883] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xbc4/0xdc0 [nfnetlink]
[ 1360.548909] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink]
[ 1360.548927] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0
[ 1360.548935] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610
[ 1360.548944] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510
[ 1360.548953] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120
[ 1360.548961] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140
[ 1360.548971] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120
[ 1360.548982] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d
[ 1360.548994] Freed by task 192222:
[ 1360.548999] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
[ 1360.549009] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 1360.549019] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
[ 1360.549028] poison_slab_object+0x100/0x180
[ 1360.549036] __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30
[ 1360.549042] kfree+0xb6/0x260
[ 1360.549049] __nft_release_table+0x473/0x6a0 [nf_tables]
[ 1360.549131] nf_tables_exit_net+0x170/0x240 [nf_tables]
[ 1360.549221] ops_exit_list+0x50/0xa0
[ 1360.549229] free_exit_list+0x101/0x140
[ 1360.549236] unregister_pernet_operations+0x107/0x160
[ 1360.549245] unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30
[ 1360.549254] nf_tables_module_exit+0x43/0x80 [nf_tables]
[ 1360.549345] __do_sys_delete_module+0x253/0x370
[ 1360.549352] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120
[ 1360.549360] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d
(gdb) list *__nft_release_table+0x473
0x1e033 is in __nft_release_table (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11354).
11349 list_for_each_entry_safe(flowtable, nf, &table->flowtables, list) {
11350 list_del(&flowtable->list);
11351 nft_use_dec(&table->use);
11352 nf_tables_flowtable_destroy(flowtable);
11353 }
11354 list_for_each_entry_safe(set, ns, &table->sets, list) {
11355 list_del(&set->list);
11356 nft_use_dec(&table->use);
11357 if (set->flags & (NFT_SET_MAP | NFT_SET_OBJECT))
11358 nft_map_deactivat
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff()
There was previously a theoretical window where swapoff() could run and
teardown a swap_info_struct while a call to free_swap_and_cache() was
running in another thread. This could cause, amongst other bad
possibilities, swap_page_trans_huge_swapped() (called by
free_swap_and_cache()) to access the freed memory for swap_map.
This is a theoretical problem and I haven't been able to provoke it from a
test case. But there has been agreement based on code review that this is
possible (see link below).
Fix it by using get_swap_device()/put_swap_device(), which will stall
swapoff(). There was an extra check in _swap_info_get() to confirm that
the swap entry was not free. This isn't present in get_swap_device()
because it doesn't make sense in general due to the race between getting
the reference and swapoff. So I've added an equivalent check directly in
free_swap_and_cache().
Details of how to provoke one possible issue (thanks to David Hildenbrand
for deriving this):
--8<-----
__swap_entry_free() might be the last user and result in
"count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE".
swapoff->try_to_unuse() will stop as soon as soon as si->inuse_pages==0.
So the question is: could someone reclaim the folio and turn
si->inuse_pages==0, before we completed swap_page_trans_huge_swapped().
Imagine the following: 2 MiB folio in the swapcache. Only 2 subpages are
still references by swap entries.
Process 1 still references subpage 0 via swap entry.
Process 2 still references subpage 1 via swap entry.
Process 1 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache().
-> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE
[then, preempted in the hypervisor etc.]
Process 2 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache().
-> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE
Process 2 goes ahead, passes swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(), and calls
__try_to_reclaim_swap().
__try_to_reclaim_swap()->folio_free_swap()->delete_from_swap_cache()->
put_swap_folio()->free_swap_slot()->swapcache_free_entries()->
swap_entry_free()->swap_range_free()->
...
WRITE_ONCE(si->inuse_pages, si->inuse_pages - nr_entries);
What stops swapoff to succeed after process 2 reclaimed the swap cache
but before process1 finished its call to swap_page_trans_huge_swapped()?
--8<----- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtl8xxxu: add cancel_work_sync() for c2hcmd_work
The workqueue might still be running, when the driver is stopped. To
avoid a use-after-free, call cancel_work_sync() in rtl8xxxu_stop(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: Fix potential data-race in __nft_obj_type_get()
nft_unregister_obj() can concurrent with __nft_obj_type_get(),
and there is not any protection when iterate over nf_tables_objects
list in __nft_obj_type_get(). Therefore, there is potential data-race
of nf_tables_objects list entry.
Use list_for_each_entry_rcu() to iterate over nf_tables_objects
list in __nft_obj_type_get(), and use rcu_read_lock() in the caller
nft_obj_type_get() to protect the entire type query process. |
